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Summary
In recent years, a large number of papers have explored different attempts to endogenise
technical change in climate models. The obvious reason is that technical change is
widely considered the main route to achieving a significant reduction in global GHG
emissions. This recent literature has emphasized that four factors – two inputs and two
outputs – should play a major role when modelling technical change in climate models.
The two inputs are R&D investments and Learning by Doing, the two outputs are
energy-saving and fuel switching. Indeed, R&D investments and Learning by Doing are
the main drivers of a climate-friendly technical change that eventually affect both
energy intensity and  fuel-mix. In this paper, we present and discuss an extension of the
FEEM-RICE model in which these four factors are explicitly accounted for. In our new
specification of endogenous technical change, an index of technical progress depends on
both Learning by Researching and Learning by Doing. This index enters the equations
defining energy intensity (i.e. the amount of carbon energy required to produce one unit
of output) and carbon intensity (i.e. the level of carbonization of primarily used fuels).
This new specification is embodied in the RICE 99 integrated assessment climate model
and then used to generate a business as usual scenario and to analyze the relationship
between climate policy and technical change. Sensitivity analysis is performed on
different key parameters of the energy module in order to obtain crucial insights into the
relative importance of the main channels through which technological changes affects
the impact of human activities on climate. In addition, the effectiveness of different
possible ways of combining Learning by Researching and Learning by Doing is also
investigated.
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1.  Introduction 
Technological change (TC hereafter) is a major force in a country’s economic growth. Since 
before the industrial revolution, economies and societies have evolved as a result of technological 
change. This evolution has been largely beneficial, even though asymmetrically distributed within and 
across societies. However, the economic growth fostered by technical changes has had and still has a 
large impact on natural resources and the global environment. Among these impacts, the release of 
large amounts of carbon into the atmosphere is certainly a potentially damaging one, at least in the 
long-run.  The  scientific  consensus  is  that  these  emissions  will  contribute  to  changing  the  earth’s 
climate, with the consequent expected effects on e.g. average temperature, sea level , precipitation 
patterns, and consequently on agriculture production, coastal zone urban settings, biodiversity, vector 
born diseases, etc.    
Controlling the influence of human activities on climate is not an easy task. The international 
agreement that has so far come into force  has only had a very small impact on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
atmospheric concentrations. Stabilizing these concentrations at, for example, twice the pre-industrial 
levels requires per capita global emissions to peak and then decline to (at least) half their 1990 value 
by the end of the twenty-first century. This seems to be feasible only through  drastic technological 
change in the energy sector, i.e. technological innovation is increasingly seen as the main way of 
reconciling the current fundamental conflict between economic activity and environmental protection. 
No one really believes or is ready to accept that the solution to the problem of climate change 
is to  reduce  the pace of economic growth. Instead, it is believed that changes in technology will bring 
about the long awaited de-coupling of economic growth from the generation of polluting emissions. 
There  is  a  difference  in  attitude  in  this  respect,  though.  Some  maintain  a  faithful  view  that 
technological change, having a life of its own, will automatically solve the problem. Others express 
the  conviction  that  the  process  of  technological  change  by  and  large  responds  to  impulses  and 
incentives, and  therefore has to be fostered by appropriate policy actions. 
  Technological change generally leads to the substitution of obsolete and dirty technologies with 
cleaner  ones.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  technical  change  is  not  per  se  always 
environment-friendly, as it can lead to the emergence of new sectors and industries with new kinds 
and degrees of pollution problems, like the generation of new harmful pollutants. There are therefore 
no substitutes for policy in directing the innovation efforts toward fostering economic growth and 
helping the environment at the same time (see the evidence in Galeotti, 2003). 
All the above remarks are reflected in climate models, the main quantitative tools designed 
either to depict long-run energy and pollution scenarios or to assist in climate change policy analysis.   3 
Indeed, these models have traditionally accounted for the presence of technical change, albeit usually 
evolving  in  an  exogenous  fashion.  More  recently,  however,  models  have  been  proposed  where 
technology changes endogenously and/or its change is induced by deliberate choices of agents and 
government intervention. Both bottom-up and top-down models, a long standing distinction in energy-
economy-environment modelling, have been recently modified in order to accommodate forms of 
endogenous technical change. As it turns out, the bottom-up approach has mostly experimented with 
the notion of Learning by Doing (LbD henceforth), while a few top-down models have entertained the 
notion of a stock of knowledge which accumulates over time via R&D spending. 
  We do not intend to review here the recent literature on the role of TC in the economics of 
climate change and on the incorporation of induced TC in climate-economy models. This has been 
done elsewhere (Cf. Carraro and Galeotti, 2002, 2004; Löschel, 2002).  Our intention here is rather  to  
identify  the  main  features  that  a  model  of  technological  change  should  possess  (Cf.  Clarke  and 
Weyant, 2002 for a similar exercise) and then develop a new climate model in which most of these 
features are taken into account.  
  In  the  new  model,  dubbed  FEEM-RICE,  that  will  be  presented  and  tested  in  this  paper, 
changes  in  technology  affect  the  economy  and  climate  through  modifications  of  both  the  energy 
intensity of production and the carbon emission intensity of energy consumed. The driver of these 
intensity  ratios  is  a  new,  crucial  variable,  deemed  Technical  Progress  (TP),  which  is  a  convex 
combination of two stocks, an abatement-based one and an R&D-based one. These stocks are designed 
to  capture  the  two  main  modes  of  induced  TC,  Learning-by-Doing  (LbD)  and  Learning-by-
Researching  (LbR).  We  hypothesize  that    these  two  sources  of  technical  change  cannot  easily 
substitute one another. 
  As  there  is  basically  little  guidance  to  the  calibration  of  the  crucial  TC  parameters,  in 
particular  in  the  context  of  a  regional  model  of  the  world  economy,  we  carry  out  a  number  of 
optimisation runs in which the key TC parameters are modified and their impact on energy and carbon 
intensity are quantified. This sensitivity analysis will enable us to test the robustness of the model and 
to identify which parameters from which our main results derive. 
  The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the recent literature on 
induced technical change and identifies the main features that an ideal model should possess. Section 3 
presents the FEEM-RICE model and provides a technical discussion on how Technical Progress has 
been modelled. Section 4 presents the results of our policy analysis and tests the sensitivity of our  
formulation of technical change to changes in its main parameters. Some concluding comments and 
suggestions for further research close the paper. 
   4 
2. Modelling Induced Technical Change: Key Features and the Ideal Case 
Induced TC does not involve the mere passage of time, but it stems from deliberate research 
and  the  innovation  decisions  of  economic  agents.  These  decisions  are  influenced  by  a  variety  of 
economic factors that are not limited to the changes in relative prices. In other words, induced TC 
refers  to  both  shifts  of  the  production  isoquant,  and  shifts  along  the  production  isoquant.  Policy 
measures adopted at the local, national or international level play an important role in inducing these 
technological changes. 
As  noted  by  Clarke  and  Weyant  (2002),  theoretical  work  on  endogenous  TC    comprises 
essentially of two strands: innovation theory and endogenous growth theory.
1 Innovation theory has a 
microeconomic focus, looks at individual firms and industries, and stresses the incentives and the 
inefficiencies that result from the failure to share the benefits of the innovation activity. Endogenous 
growth theory has a macroeconomic focus, and analyses how investment in innovation by private 
agents can be a source of aggregate economic growth. 
Climate change models typically try to combine aspects of both theories. They both stress the 
importance of knowledge as being a public good and highlight the importance of spillovers, as the 
incomplete  appropriability  of  the  benefits  from  innovation  by  private  firms  creates  positive 
externalities.  Spillovers  cause  underinvestment  in  innovation,  appropriability  favours  monopoly 
behaviour.  Most  theoretical  work  shows  and  empirical  work  confirms  that  markets  do  not  invest 
efficiently in innovation and that underinvestment is significant enough to warrant attention by policy 
makers. This situation is known as “innovation market failures” and should represent an essential 
aspect  of  induced  TC  modelling.  However,  since  these  failures  are  also  very  complex,    rigorous 
modelling is problematic. 
It is nonetheless a useful exercise to consider the main ingredients of induced TC and the 
various aspects of those innovation market failures. Consideration of these elements will provide a sort 
of checklist that can be used against the numerical climate-economy models incorporating induced TC 
that have appeared in current literature. And, above all, it will be useful to identify the main features of 
the new model that will be described below.  
Let  us  therefore  summarize  the  main  features  that  an  ideal  model  of  induced  TC  should 
possess (Cf. Clarke and Weyant, 2002): 
·  Because spillovers are a fundamental source of economic growth, they ought to be incorporated in 
any model aiming to model the long-term process of TC. A full accounting of spillovers in climate 
change models is probably asking too much, as they occur within industries, across industries 
                                                       
1  This  is  not  to  say  that  theorizing  in  the  field  of  TC  is  limited  to  these  two  areas  only.  Innovation  and 
endogenous  growth  are  the  two  areas  most  directly  relevant  for  modeling  induced  TC  in  climate-economy 
models.   5 
within countries, and across countries. Clearly, however, to account for intersectoral spillovers a 
model must be disaggregated by sector, while to account for international spillovers the model 
must include  regional disaggregation.  
·  The difference between private and social returns associated with innovation activity ought to be 
acknowledged.  Private  returns  to  R&D  tend  to  be  appreciably  smaller  than  social  returns,  in 
proportions of 20-30% to around 50% according to the empirical study considered. 
·  Climate  models  with  induced  TC  must  specify  the  mechanism  through  which  technological 
change  takes  place  and  the  way  it  alters  technology.  The  two  mechanisms  that  have  been 
considered to date are research and development spending and experience building. An advantage 
of the LbD approach is its simplicity and its reduced calibration requirements relative to the R&D 
approach.  The  latter,  on  the  other  hand,  allows  for  more  room  for  policy  maneuvering 
(energy/environmental R&D can be subsidized or stimulated) and additional control variables to 
rely on. Clearly, neither approach is a complete picture of what goes on in reality, so  models  
based on one or the other formulation inevitably miss something important. While no model can 
closely  approximate  the  real  world,  the  question  is  whether  and  at  what  modeling  cost  it  is 
possible to account for both varieties of induced TC in a satisfactory manner. 
·  Besides the choice between the TC – R&D vs. experience drivers– it is also important to specify 
where  and how those drivers actually bring about a  change in technology. One distinction is 
between energy and non-energy sector. Our modeling strategy is to start with induced TC in the 
energy  industry,  leaving  other  TC  as  exogenous.  While,  as  previously  noted,  it  is  true  that 
intersectoral spillovers are important, it would probably be too complex to include the complex 
interrelations between energy technologies and other techonlogies. The resulting model would be 
too abstract or too cumbersome to be of any use. 
·  It may be worthwhile to consider two sources of energy-saving or carbon-saving improvements: 
decarbonization of energy services and reduction in the energy intensity of economic activities. 
The second source of TC is more complicated to account for since it involves R&D in sectors 
other  than  the  energy  industry.  In  the  light  of  the  previous  remark,  modelers  may  consider 
assumimg  that the evolution of the energy intensity of non-energy technologies is exogenously 
generated. 
·  Induced  TC  is  not  an  all-or-nothing  proposition.  There  are  complementary  sources  of 
technological advance. One is public sector R&D: publicly financed research will accompany 
subsidies to private R&D   in the form of TC fostering policies. Another source is intersectoral 
spillovers,  already  mentioned  above.  The  final  source  of  TC  is  major  innovations  and 
breakthroughs. What do these complementary sources tell us about modeling TC? The implication 
is that ultimately some technological progress must remain exogenous.   6 
·  Technological heterogeneity is an important issue. One potential implication is discontinuous TC. 
Even  if  innovation  is  continuous  and  incremental  in  individual  technologies,  the  aggregate 
production  function’s  response  to  innovation  investment  may  be  non-linear  and  exhibit 
discontinuities. What do induced TC models miss when they aggregate technologies? Aggregate 
models are not able to account for the relevance of emerging technologies and the associated 
notion that the allocation, not only the absolute level, of innovation is important. In this respect, 
models can in principle account for heterogenous technologies. Bottom-up models are best suited 
for  the  purpose,  whereas  top-down  models  can  probably  at  most  distinguish  between  carbon-
intensive and non-carbon-intensive technologies. 
·  TC  is  an  uncertain  process.  Uncertainty  affects  both  the  rate  and  direction  of  TC.  It  also 
characterizes the potential for new technologies, that is the extent to which individual technologies 
will  respond  to  R&D  or  experience,  and  the  heterogeneity  and  discontinuities  in  technology 
development. Essentially these are “parameter” uncertainties, where the parameters refer to the 
response of technology to innovative effort or R&D. These are important for modeling and the 
issue  can  be  addressed  by  basing  that  response  on  expected  values  of  uncertain  parameter 
distributions. 
·  Innovation takes time and is risky. To the extent that markets have different preferences for risk 
and time than society preferences, markets will invest in innovation differently than would be 
socially optimal. Risk aversion and discounting start to play a role when we consider technological 
heterogeneity, and emerging environmental technologies in particular. This aspect can be then best 
addressed by bottom-up models which are capable of distinguishing between more mature and 
newer technologies, and between more and less competitive technologies. The deviation of private 
risk aversion and time preference from socially preferred values can however also be captured, 
though in an ad hoc fashion, by bottom-up models that arbitrarily increase  the price of R&D 
resources or adjust the spillover parameter(s)upward. 
·  Not all investment activity can be captured by models assuming rational behavior. Entrepreneurial 
spirit  can  also  guide  innovation  choices.  While  climate  models  are  likely  to  face  serious 
difficulties in explicitly accounting for this aspect, they can nevertheless allow for an implication 
of  quasi-rational,  or  routine-based  behavior  (as  in  evolutionary  theories):  the  tendency  to 
undertake research efforts on technologies already in use will bias private sector behavior toward 
dominant technologies. The effect is therefore similar to the one made in the previous point . 
·  The very essence of evolutionary economics and  historical evidence suggest that technological 
change evolves with a lot of inertia. It is, in other words, characterized by path dependence. This 
implies that the rate, and especially the direction, of TC may respond sluggishly to economic 
stimuli relative to the no frictions standard neoclassical models. More problematically, it also   7 
implies that what we do today affects how the economy will respond in the future, i.e. today’s 
actions  redirect  the  future  path  of  TC.  Incorporating  path  dependence  into  climate  models  is 
probably prohibitively complicated, unless perhaps if we resort to adding time lags to the process 
of technology development. 
·  A final point refers to technology diffusion as opposed to technology innovation. One obvious 
way to account for this aspect is the introduction of time lags, as noted above. This strategy does 
not do justice to the importance and implications of technological diffusion vis-à-vis technology 
development,  but  it  may  represent  a  reasonable  shortcut,  an  acceptable  compromise  to  make 
especially in top-down models. 
To date the literature on this includes only a few examples of numerical climate-economy 
models where induced TC is explicitly modelled. We do not intend to review these various models 
here. We simply mention these models and refer to Table 1 below for a picture showing which of the 
above ideal aspects each individual model does or does not address. 
The models considered are, in the bottom-up energy systems class, versions of the multi-
regional  MESSAGE-MARKAL  model  (Messner,  1997;  Barreto  and  Kypreos,  2002a;  Criqui, 
Klaassen, and Schrattenholzer, 2000; Miketa and Schrattenholzer, 2002; Barreto and Kypreos, 2002b, 
2004). These are dynamic linear programming models of the energy sector that are generally used in 
tandem with MACRO, a macro-economic model which provides economic data for the energy sector 
(Manne,  1981;  see  also  Seebregts,  Kram,  Schaeffer,  Stoffer,  Kypreos,  Barreto,  Messner,  and 
Schrattenholzer, 1999; Manne and Barreto, 2004). These models yield the optimal choice between 
several different technologies using given abatement costs and carbon emission targets. In addition, 
they  feature  a  learning  or  experience  curve  describing  technological  progress  as  a  function  of 
accumulating experience with production (LbD for manufacturers) and with use (learning-by-using – 
LbU – for consumers) of a technology during its diffusion. 
Among  top-down  models,  we  consider  Manne  and  Richels  (1992)’s  MERGE  model,  a 
regional intertemporal growth model which combines a top-down perspective on the remainder of the 
economy together with a bottom-up representation of the energy supply sector. In a recent version of 
the model (Manne and Richels, 2002), one of the previous two electric backstop technologies, the low-
cost  one,  is  replaced  by  a  LbD  process.  Another  model  which  exploits  the  notion  of  LbD  to 
endogenize technical change is DEMETER, a global model proposed by van der Zwaan, Gerlagh, 
Klaassen, and Schrattenholzer (2002) (see also Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2000; Gerlagh, van der 
Zwaan, Hofkes, and Klaassen, 2000; Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2004). A macroeconomic (top-
down) model is specified and distinguishes between two different energy technologies, carbon and 
carbon-free. The costs of the latter are dependent upon the cumulative capacity installed. Thus the 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   9 
A  recent  evolution  of  DEMETER  is  the  partial  equilibrium  model  of  energy  supply  and 
demand elaborated by Gerlagh and Lise (2003). DEMETER-2E, as it is called, entertains two energy 
technologies for the production of a carbon-rich and a carbon-poor input. R&D is combined with LbD. 
R&D-based knowledge is combined with capital and labour in a technology which produces more and 
more energy input over time thanks to LbD. 
An example of multi-region, multi-sector integrated assessment model with induced TC is 
Kemfert (2002)’s WIAGEM. In this recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium  model, R&D 
spending affects the productivity of the energy input to the production process. More R&D therefore 
results in increased energy efficiency. It is to be noticed that R&D enters the model as a flow, whereas 
most  of  the  other  R&D-based  models  adopt  the  stock  of  knowledge,  accumulated  through  R&D 
investments, as the driver of TC. 
Finally, there are models of induced TC that extend the Nordhaus’ RICE/DICE family of 
models. In particular, we include the optimal growth (regional) RICE models elaborated by Buonanno, 
Carraro, Castelnuovo, and Galeotti (2000) and Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002). These models, 
called  ETC-RICE,  extend  Nordhaus  and  Yang  (1996)’s  RICE  model  to  allow  for  a  R&D-based 
formulation  of  induced  TC.  In  the  vein  of  Goulder  and  Mathai  (2000),  in  subsequent  work 
Castelnuovo, Galeotti, Gambarelli, and Vergalli (2003) specify a version of the ETC-RICE model that 
features instead an experience-based type of induced TC. 
The new version of the RICE/DICE model (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) is used by Nordhaus 
(2002) to lay out a model of induced innovation brought about by R&D efforts.  This study is often 
quoted by authors to support the conclusion that induced technical change is not very important. Input 
substitution  away  from  “carbon  energy”,  appears  to  be  more  relevant,  relative  to  R&D-prompted 
innovation. The former reduces carbon intensity twice as much as the latter. Nordhaus compares two 
versions  of  DICE,  the  global  counterpart  of  the  RICE  model.  In  one  case,  output-constrained 
movements along the production isoquant are considered; in the induced innovation version, capital is 
exogenous, i.e. there is no investment and no GDP growth, and there is a technology with fixed 
coefficients between carbon energy on the one hand and a capital-labor combination on the other. It 
remains  to  be  seen  how  the  results  change  when,  more  realistically,  optimal  economic  growth  is 
allowed.  
This is precisely what Popp (2004a) does in his ENTICE model. As in Nordhaus, R&D is four 
times more costly than physical investment, to account for the divergent social and private rates of 
return associated with R&D. In addition, the author assumes that 50% of other R&D is crowded out by 
energy  R&D,  thus  raising  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  latter.
2  In  a  very  recent  variation  dubbed 
ENTICE-BR,  Popp  (2004b)  extends  the  ENTICE  model  to  also  include  an  energy  backstop 
technology. Finally, Popp (2004c) uses the ENTICE model to study the role of government subsidies 
                                                       
2  As  stated,  unlike  Nordhaus’  R&DICE  model,  Popp’s  ENTICE  model  does  not  impose  zero  substitution 
possibilities between energy on the one hand and capital and labor on the other when research is endogenously 
determined.   10 
to climate-friendly R&D. These are found to significantly increase R&D, but to have little effect on 
the climate itself. 
  As  can be seen from this brief overview – and  above all from Table 1 in the Appendix – 
existing models fall short of addressing the ideal features of induced TC that were outlined at the 
beginning of this section. This is why, in the next section, we will present a new model of induced TC 
that we hope will prove more satisfactory than previous ones. 
 
3. The FEEM-RICE Model 
The FEEM-RICE model which we present hereafter is an extended version of the so-called 
RICE  99  model  by  Nordhaus  and  Boyer  (2000).  RICE  99  is  a  Ramsey-Koopmans  single  sector 
optimal growth model suitably extended to incorporate the interactions between economic activities 
and climate. There is one such model for each of the eight macro regions into which the world is 
divided:  USA,  Other  High  Income  countries  (OHI),  OECD  Europe  (Europe),  Russia  and  Eastern 
European countries (REE), Middle Income countries (MI), Lower Middle Income countries (LMI), 
China (CHN), and Low Income countries (LI).
3 
 
3.1 The Model General Structure 
Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of two control variables, fixed 
investment and carbon energy input, so as to maximize welfare, defined as the present value of per 
capita consumption. The value added created via production (net of climate change) according to a 
constant  returns  technology  is  used  for  investment  and  consumption,  after  subtraction  of  energy 
spending. The technology is Cobb-Douglas and combines the inputs from capital, labour and carbon 
energy together with the level of technology. Population (taken to be equal to full employment) and 
technology levels grow over time in an exogenous fashion, whereas capital accumulation is governed 
by the optimal rate of investment. 
Compared to the previous RICE 96 model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996), this specification 
contains a more detailed regional disaggregation of the world. However, the main novelty of the new 
model is the introduction of an energy input. Because carbon dioxide is the only greenhouse gas 
considered, the input is directly measured in carbon units. The carbon energy can be thought of as the 
energy services derived from fossil-fuel consumption (e.g. derived from coal, petroleum, and natural 
gas). An implication of the introduction of this crucial input is that its market must be specified. While 
demand for  carbon energy stems naturally from the first principles of the  entrepreneur (or social 
planner)’s problem, a supply curve for this input is introduced somewhat ad hoc, and it allows for 
limited (albeit huge) long-run supplies at rising costs. Because of the optimal-growth framework, 
carbon-energy is efficiently allocated across time, which implies that low-cost carbon resources have 
                                                       
3 The countries belonging to each one of the macro-regions indicated above are listed in Nordhaus and Boyer’s 
book. We refer to it as RICE 99 because it was made available by the authors through the web in 1999.   11 
scarcity prices (Hotelling rents) and that carbon-energy prices rise over time.
4 The carbon-energy input 
is modelled as being the source of GHG emissions in the production process, and the cumulated 
emissions (i.e. concentrations) cause an increase in the worldwide temperature. To close the circle, 
global temperature (relative to pre-industrial levels) is responsible for the wedge between gross output 
and net of climate change effects.  
Control variables are determined within a game-theory framework. Each country plays a non-
cooperative Nash game in a dynamic setting which yields an Open Loop Nash equilibrium. In each 
region the planner maximizes its utility subject to the individual resource and capital constraints and 
the climate module for a given emission production of all the other players.
5 Kyoto-type international 
environmental agreements can be easily accommodated by adding a constraint stating that regional 
emissions cannot exceed a given upper limit. It is also possible to use the model in the presence of 
international emission trading. In this case the standard identity between sources and uses of resources 
specifies that output is used for consumption  and investment, to which proceeds or sales from net 
imports of permits are be added. 
Under the possibility of emission trading, the sequence whereby an equilibrium à la Nash is 
reached must be revised as follows. Each region maximizes its utility subject to the individual resource 
and capital constraints, the emission target constraint, and the climate module for a given optimal set 
of strategies of all the other players and a given price of permits (in the first round this is set at an 
arbitrary level). When all regions have made their optimal choices, the overall net demand for permits 
is computed at the given price. If the sum of net demands in each period is approximately zero, a Nash 
equilibrium is obtained; otherwise the price is revised in proportion to the market unbalance and each 
region’s decision process starts again. The price of a unit of tradable emission permits is expressed in 
terms of the numéraire output price and there is an additional policy variable, i.e. the net demand for 
permits. 
 
3.2 The Treatment of Technical Change in FEEM-RICE 
The original RICE 99 model specifies the following production function (n indexes regions, t 
time periods): 
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4 Thus the new version of RICE incorporates a treatment of energy supply, which is seen as an exhaustible 
resource. Another addition is a revised and extended climate module which now includes a three-reservoir model 
calibrated to existing carbon-cycle models. The equations of the original model retained in FEEM-RICE are 
reported in the Appendix. 
5 As there is no international trade in the model, regions are interdependent  through climate variables only. The 
absence of trade in goods among regions is an important limitation of all regional versions of RICE. We plan to 
address this issue in the near future.   12 
where Q is output (gross of climate change effects), A the exogenously given level of technology and 
KF, CE and L are the inputs from physical capital, carbon energy and labour, respectively, and p
E is 
fossil fuel price. Carbon emissions are proportional to carbon energy, that is: 
 
(2)  ) , (   ) , ( ) , ( t n CE t n t n E z =  
 
where E is industrial CO2 emissions, while V is an idiosyncratic carbon intensity ratio which also 
exogenously declines over time.
6 In this way, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) make the assumption of a 
gradual, costless improvement of the green technology gained by the agents as time goes by. For the 
reasons discussed in the previous section, we consider this treatment of TC inadequate for a model 
designed to study issues related to climate change. 
In previous work (see Carraro and Galeotti, 2002, 2004), we explored the consequences of two 
ways  of  endogenising  the  process  of  TC.  First,  in  the  “Learning-by-Researching”  model,  an 
endogenously generated stock of knowledge affected both factor productivity and the emission-output 
ratio (there was no energy input and emissions were linked directly to unabated output). Knowledge 
was  the  result  of  intertemporal  optimal  accumulation  of  R&D,  where  R&D  is  a  choice  variable 
describing  a  new  investment  opportunity  in  addition  to  consumption  and  physical  investment. 
Secondly, in the “Learning-by-Doing” model, knowledge, conceived as a stock of experience, was 
approximated  by  installed  capacity,  in  turn  represented  by  physical  capital  accumulating  through 
periodic  investment.  Again,  this  stock  of  experience  affected  both  factor  productivity  and  the 
emission-output ratio. This LbD approach entailed one less choice variable with respect to the R&D 
approach, but no further claim on resources created or on consumption and physical investment??, was 
made. 
The main shortcomings of these formulations  derive chiefly from the absence of an explicit 
energy module in the core model,. The absence of an energy production factor made it impossible to 
capture  the  effects  of  TC  on  the  energy  intensity  of  production.  Moreover,  the  “Learning-by-
Researching”  and  the  “Learning-by-Doing”  features  of  TC  were  modelled  separately,  whereas  it 
would appear appropriate to include both sources of TC in the same model. Finally, approximating the 
stock of experience with physical capital was not very accurate, but the presence of the abatement rate 
as a model control variable made it difficult, if not impossible, to account for cumulated abatement 
efforts as the force driving the learning process.
7 
                                                       
6 Throughout the paper we will indifferently refer to ‘environmental’ technology or ‘green’ technology when 
mentioning the time-varying coefficient V. 
7 Recall that cumulated abatement was the variable used by Goulder and Mathai (2000) in the LbD version of 
their cost minimization model. The absence of the energy input, and therefore of an explicit price, made it also 
impossible to carry out any policy analysis on energy or carbon taxation.   13 
In the newly developed model, the above shortcomings have been explicitly addressed and 
solved. In FEEM-RICE, we consider simultaneously both LbD and LbR as inputs of induced TC and 
we focus on the effects of TC on both the energy intensity of production and the carbon intensity of 
energy use. These features of the model allow us to address both energy-saving and energy-switching 
issues.  
To clarify the importance of this two input-two output specification of TC, it is perhaps useful 
to  refer  to  a  time-honoured  concept  in  environmental  economics,  namely  Kaya’s  identity.  In  its 
generalized form, it can be represented as follows. Let i = 1,.., I be the various GHG emissions, E, j = 
1,.., J be the various energy sources, S, k = 1,.., K be the sectors in the economy, Y, and n = 1,.., N be 
the countries in the world. Then, the world emissions of GHGs, Et, can be decomposed as follows: 













































where L is total world population. Hence, world emissions are a product of two ‘forces’: 
techno-economic  forces,  given  by  carbon  intensity  (E/S)  and  energy  intensity  (S/Y),  and  socio-
economic forces, given by output composition (Yk/Y) and output levels (Y/L), as well as demographic 
dynamics L. Similarly to the RICE 99 model, FEEM-RICE has a single economic sector and a single 
energy source, namely carbon energy, CE, and endogenous emission are limited to industrial CO2. 
Thus, the relationship stated in (3) can be rewritten for our specific case as: 

































In  addition  to  socio-economic  forces  –  income  and  population  –  which  are  commonly 
modelled in endogenous growth models, our model allows us to endogenise both techno-economic 
forces, namely energy and carbon intensity
8. 
The main novelty of our new formulation hinges on the relationship between TC and both 
Learning-by-Researching  and  Learning-by-Doing  at  the  same  time.  We  assume  that  innovation  is 
brought  about  by  R&D  spending  which  contributes  to  the  accumulation  of  the  stock  of  existing 
knowledge.
9 In addition to this Learning-by-Researching effect, the model also accounts for the effect 
of Learning-by-Doing, now modelled in terms of cumulated abatement efforts. Thus, our index of 
technical change TP (Technical Progress) is defined as follows: 
 
                                                       
8  As  in  most  models  in  current  literature,  population  is  exogenously  determined.  An  important  future 
development would be that of endogenising demographic changes, including migration flows across regions. 
9  It  has  to  be  pointed  out  that  analysing  R&D  expenditure  is  complicated  because  (i)  R&D  is  not  always 
amenable  to  measurement  and  (ii)  there  is  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  in  the  ability  of  R&D  to  generate 
technological change. These words of caution should be therefore borne in mind by the reader when going 
through the paper.    14 
(4)  )] , ( ), , ( [ ) , ( t n K t n ABAT f t n TP R =  
 
The variable TP is assumed to affect both energy intensity (i.e., the quantity of carbon energy required 
to produce one unit of output) and carbon intensity (i.e., the level of carbonization of primarily used 
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where  ) , ( t n K R  is the stock of knowledge and ABATS represents the stock of cumulated abatement, in 
turn defined as: 
 
(6)  ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 , ( t n ABAT t n ABAT t n ABAT s B A S d d - + = +  
 
ABATF the abatement flow,  A d the learning factor, i.e. the amount of abatement which translates into a 
learning  experience,  and  B d   being  the  depreciation  rate  of  cumulated  experience.  The  stock  of 
knowledge  ) , ( t n K R  accumulates in the usual fashion: 
 
(7)  ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( & ) 1 , ( t n K t n D R t n K R R R d - + = +  
 
where  R d  is the depreciation rate of knowledge. 
  How does Technical Progress affect the rest of the economy? As seen in equation (1), the 
factors of production are labour, physical capital and carbon energy. Let us first consider the effect of 
technical progress on factor productivity (the energy-intensity effect). In our model, the production 
function (1) is replaced by the following equation: 
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and  n n 1 0   and   b b  are region specific parameters. Thus, an increase in the endogenously determined 
Technical Progress variable reduces – ceteris paribus – the output elasticity of the energy input. It is   15 
worth noting that the output technology in (1’) also accounts for a fraction of TC which evolves 
exogenously, thus following an explicit suggestion by Clarke and Weyant (2000) and the discussion in 
the previous section. 
  Let  us  now  turn  to  the  effect  of  Technical  Progress  on  the  carbon  intensity  of  energy 
consumption. As shown in (2), effective energy results from  both fossil fuel use and (exogenous) TC 
in the energy sector. In our model, we assume that TP serves the purpose of reducing, ceteris paribus, 
the level of carbon emissions. More precisely, equation (2) is replaced by: 
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Here an increase in TP progressively reduces the amount of emissions   generated by a unit of fossil 
fuel consumed. Finally, we recognize that R&D spending absorbs some resources, that is: 
 
(9)  ) , ( ) ( ) , ( & ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( t n NIP t p t n D R t n I t n C t n Y + + + =  
 
where Y is output net of climate change effects, C is consumption, I gross fixed capital formation, 
R&D research and development expenditures, p
P is the equilibrium price on the emissions rights, and 
NIP is the net demand for permits.  
It may be noted that there is only one type of R&D effort that helps both to save  energy and 
switch the energy needs away from fossil fuels. Although in principle it could be argued that the 
innovation activity resulting in technologies using less energy is different from the innovation activity 
resulting in the development of clean energy technologies, in practice accounting for this fact in highly 
aggregate models like FEEM-RICE is probably too complicated to be worth considering . Finally, 
“red” TC – i.e. purely productivity-enhancing TC (captured by the A index in the production function) 
–  has  been  kept  exogenous,  albeit  time  varying,  though  we  believe  that  “red”  R&D  can  also  be 
endogenised (this is something we plan to do in future work). 
To  further  clarify  our  formulation  of  induced  TC,  let  us  highlight  the  dynamic 
interrelationships between the different variables and their role in the model. First of all, let us notice 
that  R&D  is  a  control  variable,  whereas  stock  of  knowledge  and  cumulated  abatement  are  state 
variables.  Therefore,  R&D  can  be  used  strategically  by  regulators  in  each  region  of  the  model, 
whereas LbD is an output of the regulator’s strategic behaviour (which also includes the optimal path 
of other control variables, e.g. investment and demand for permits). This is quite clear at the beginning 
of the game (see Figure 1). At stage one, only LbR through R&D investments occurs. This modifies 
TP (which evolves both endogenously and exogenously) and yields some amount of abatement, i.e. 
some  abatement  experience  which  becomes  LbD.  Both  LbR  and  LbD  then  affects  TP  in  the 
subsequent stages.   16 
In short, the fundamental driver of technical progress is basic research and R&D investments. 
This induces knowledge accumulation and experience in emission abatement in various regions of the 
world. In turn, these variables move technology towards a more environment-friendly dynamic path.   
 
 
Figure 1. Effects of LbR and LbD on Technical Progress. 
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  Our quite general solution to account for induced TC comes obviously at a cost. Basically, little 
information to calibrate the model parameters is available.
10 The best strategy we can follow is to 
guess-estimate the critical TC parameters and then compare the output of the models with data on 
observed variables. At the same time, we perform an extensive sensitivity analysis on the parameters 
of our formulation of induced TC . This is what will be shown in the next section.  
 
4. Results and Sensitivity Analysis  
In this section, we present the outputs of the model in its basic calibration and the results of our 
sensitivity analysis. The basic calibration is obtained by using the parameters of the original RICE 99 
models and by assuming that c and d are both equal to 0.5. Sensitivity analysis is then performed by 
assuming d = 1-c and varying c. Through these two parameters we control for the role of researching 
vs. learning in the process of TC, whereas through the parameters bo and ψ we control for the impact 
of technical progress on energy intensity and carbon intensity respectively (see Figure 2). 
                                                       
10 For this reason we attribute some parameters  the same numerical value for all regions.   17 
 
 
Figure 2. The Crucial Parameters of the Induced TC Model. 
                 
     
 
The initial values of the main parameters are shown in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2. Initial parameter values 
 
Parameter  bo  dP  dA  dB  ψ  c  d 
Value  0.8  0.05  0.1  0.05  0.8  0.5  1-c 
 
 
Extensive sensitivity analysis has been performed on the parameters  0 b , y  and c. Results are 
shown in Figures A.1-A.12 (see the Appendix) for three scenarios: 
 
-  the business as usual (BaU) scenario in which no climate policy intervention is envisaged; 
-  the  550  ppmv  stabilisation  scenario  in  which  CO2  concentrations  are  stabilised  by  adopting 
domestic measures only (including R&D investments); and  
-  the 550 ppmv stabilisation scenario in which all countries/regions achieve the stabilisation target  
by also participating in a global emission trading market. 
 
There is no special reason to choose these three scenarios rather than other ones. In addition to the 
standard business as usual scenario – that  proves very helpful in calibrating the model – we analyse 
two  550  ppmv  stabilisation  scenarios  in  order  to  test  how  the  model  reacts  to  different  policies 
designed to achieve a fairly ambitious climate objective. In the first stabilisation scenario, the goal is 
to analyse the role of technical change in the absence of emission trading (a flexibility mechanism that 
was already shown to be a substitute for technical change in achieving climate stabilisation targets. 
See  Buonanno  et  al.,  2000,  2002).  In  the  second  stabilisation  scenario,  the  goal  is  to  check  the 
different incentives to innovation provided by the presence of global emission trading, i.e. of low cost 
abatement opportunities for developed countries. 
Learning by Doing 
Learning by Researching 
  Technical Progress 
    Energy Intensity 




ψ   18 
Before discussing the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, let us present the main features of the 
model in the business as usual scenario. To do that in a very concise way, the dynamics of energy 
intensity and carbon intensity is shown in the same diagram. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of these two 
variables in the case of exogenous technical change.
11 Figure 4 shows the case in which technical 
change in endogenised according to the two input–two output formulation presented above. The time 
horizon is 1995-2105. 
The difference between the two cases is clear and relevant. When technical change is exogenous, 
almost all emission reductions take place through a reduction of carbon intensity (fuel switching). By 
contrast, when technical change is endogenous, both carbon intensity and energy intensity are reduced 
over time, thanks to the accumulation of knowledge and to the learning by doing effect. Therefore, the  
version of the model with endogenous technical change better captures the dynamic path towards 
technologies which consume less energy and above all less polluting energy.  
 
 
Figure 3. Carbon Intensity vs. Energy Intensity.  
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11 The exogenous component of technical change is the one calibrated by Boyer and Nordhaus for the RICE 99 
model, but modified so as to play a weaker role when coupled with our endogenous component of TC.   19 
Figure 4. Carbon Intensity vs. Energy Intensity.  
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As for regional differences, let us focus on the model with endogenous technical change, which is 
the one that produces more satisfactory results. Notice that in Eastern Europe and China the main 
contribution to GHG emission reduction comes from fuel-switching rather than from energy-saving. 
The opposite holds for Middle Income countries, and for the US above all. In Europe and Japan (the 
main  country  in  Other  High  Income  countries  category)  emission  reductions  are  more  difficult. 
Smaller emission reductions can be achieved – relative to the other countries – and the curves first 
suggest  that  fuel-switching  investments  can  actually  reduce  emissions,  but  then  energy-saving 
becomes the dominant strategy. 
As a further contribution to the understanding of the features of our model of induced TC, let us 
analyse the contribution of the different components of technical change to the reduction of aggregate 
carbon intensity (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Contributions of Different TC Components to Lowering Carbon Intensity 
  1995  2105 
Exogenous Tech. Change  1  0.56 
Endogenous LbR based Tech. Change  1  0.42 
Carbon Intensity Index 
Endogenous LbR and LbD based Tech. Change  1  0.34 
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If only exogenous technical change is assumed, carbon intensity is going to be reduced by 44% in 
the next century. By adding the R&D based component of endogenous technical change, the total 
reduction achieves -58% with respect to the 1995 level. Finally, the contribution of both LbR and LbD 
leads, in our formulation, to a total reduction of carbon intensity of –66%. 
It is also interesting to notice that the model strongly reacts to the imposition of climate targets 
(see Figure 5 and 6). If a 550 ppmv stabilisation target has to be achieved through domestic abatement 
and technical change, initially fuel-switching possibilities are exploited in all countries, but then the 
only way to achieve the target is to increase energy-efficiency. 
This is however less true in the case of endogenous technical change than in the case of exogenous 
technical change. With this latter formulation the model shows some extreme dynamic paths. In the 
BaU scenario without climate targets, if TC is exogenous, almost all emission reductions are achieved 
through fuel-switching. With an ambitious climate target and exogenous TC, an opposite  path is 
revealed, i.e. most emission reductions must be achieved through an increase in energy-efficiency, in 
particular in the long-run.
12  
The  model  with  endogenous  technical  change  shows  a  more  balanced  dynamics  of  energy 
intensity and carbon intensity. Both fuel-switching and energy-saving are occurring in all countries, 
and fuel-switching plays a more important role than in the case of exogenous technical change. In 
addition, China and Eastern countries must provide a much more relevant contribution to emission 
reduction (let us stress that the stabilisation scenario is a normative one and is used to analyse our new 
formulation of TC and not to derive policy recommendations).  
Figure 5 and 6 confirm the difficulty experienced by Europe and Japan in reducing emissions. 
Indeed, the first best solution computed by the model allocates emission reduction across the world 
regions in an optimal way, i.e. efficiency is achieved through marginal abatement cost equalisation. 
Therefore, the smaller abatement in Europe and Japan indicates that abatement costs are higher in 
these two regions than in the other world regions. This is another indicator that confirms the good 
quality of our formulation of induced TC and of its calibration. 
To further check the quality of the model we analyse the results of the sensitivity analysis that has 
been performed on the main parameters of the model. These results are shown in Figures A.1-A.12 in 
the Appendix. Let us summarise the main conclusions. 
An increasing effect of technical change on energy saving (an increase of the parameter b0) has the 
expected consequences. In particular, temperature and carbon concentration decrease with b0 in the 




                                                       
12  Recall that the exogenous component is based on the one calibrated by Boyer and Nordhaus for RICE 99, but 
modified as mentioned in the previous footnote.   21 
Figure 5. Carbon Intensity vs. Energy Intensity.  
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Figure 6. Carbon Intensity vs. Energy Intensity.  
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A small difference across scenarios emerges as far R&D investments and TC are concerned. In the 
BaU, an increase of b0, i.e. a more effective R&D, leads to an increase in R&D investments. The 
opposite occurs for high values of b0 when a stabilisation target is imposed (see Figure A.3). The 
explanation goes as follows. In the model R&D plays a twofold role. It fosters economic growth and 
reduces the impact of economic growth on the environment. When induced TC is exogenous, only the 
first effect is strategically chosen by the regulator. Therefore, an increase of b0 gives the regulator 
more freedom to use R&D for growth purposes. When the effect of TC on emissions is endogenous, 
and  there  is  a  stabilisation  target,  the  regulator  wants  to  minimise  the  adverse  effects  that  R&D 
investments may have on emissions through economic growth. Therefore, the optimal strategy is to 
reduce R&D when its effectiveness on energy-saving becomes large (i.e. for high values of b0). 
In the third scenario, where global emission trading is allowed for, the price of permits tends to 
become lower as b0 increases (see Figure A.4). The reason is that an increase of b0 increases the 
effectiveness of TC in increasing energy efficiency, thus reducing energy consumption and GHG 
emissions. As a consequence, the world demand for permits becomes smaller and the equilibrium 
permit price is lower.  
The regularity and consistency of the responses of the model to relevant changes in the parameter 
b0 suggest that its structure and calibration are robust and coherent. 
The same conclusion can be achieved by looking at the effects of changes in the parameter ψ, 
which  controls  for  the  impacts  of  induced  TC  on  carbon  intensity  (see  Figure  A.5-A.8).  Again 
temperature and carbon concentration become lower as ψ increases, i.e. as TC becomes more effective 
in inducing fuel-switching and therefore in lowering carbon intensity. However, notice how the effects 
are much smaller than in the case of changes in b0, i.e. in the effects on energy intensity. This shows 
again that the model structure is such that energy saving is more effective than fuel switching in 
reducing  emissions, at least in the long run (results are shown for the year 2105). 
The tiny impacts of changes in the parameter ψ explain why the dynamics of R&D investments 
are different in the case of changes in ψ than in the case of changes in b0 (see Figure A.7). In the BaU 
case there are almost no changes in R&D expenditure, whereas in the two stabilisation scenarios there 
is a very small increase in R&D expenditure. The reason is that a positive change of ψ induces a very 
modest improvement of the carbon intensity ratio. Therefore, despite the emission increase through 
growth effects, the regulator finds it optimal (i.e. necessary) to slightly increase R&D investments to 
stabilise GHG emissions.  
Finally, the permit price is slowly declining with positive changes of the parameter ψ, at least in 
the long run (see Figure A.8). The reason is a small reduction of the demand for permits induced by 
the slightly enhanced performance of technical change in reducing GHG emissions. 
The last part of our sensitivity analysis concerns the parameters c and d that control for the relative 
importance  of  LbR  vs.  LbD  in  fostering  technical  change.  When  c  increases,  i.e.  when  the  LbR 
component becomes relatively more important in shaping the dynamics of technical change, both and   23 
temperature and carbon concentration decrease in the BAU scenario (see Figure A.9 and A.10). This is 
partly the case in the two stabilisation scenarios, where carbon concentrations and temperature first 
slightly increase and then decrease. However, in all cases the minimum concentration and temperature 
level is achieved for large values of c, which confirms that LbR is the fundamental driver of technical 
change in the model, whereas LbD is a very relevant side effect. 
For this same reason, R&D investments increase with c, i.e. the more LbR is effective, the more 
the regulator finds it optimal to invest in R&D (see Figure A.11). However, for very large values of c, 
the regulator can reduce its R&D investments given their large effectiveness in fostering technical 
progress. 
Finally, the dynamics of the permit price reflect the impact of R&D and technical progress on the 
demand  for  permits  (see  Figure  A.12).  When  c  becomes  large,  R&D  investments  become  more 
effective  in  reducing  both  energy  and  carbon  intensity,  i.e.  GHG  emissions.  As  a  consequence, 
regulators  in  various  countries  reduce  their  net  demand  for  permits,  thus  negatively  affecting  the 
permit price. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
  The model presented in this paper is an extension of the FEEM-RICE model in which both 
Learning by Researching and Learning by Doing are explicitly accounted for through an index of  
Technical Progress. Moreover, our index of Technical Progress affects both the relationship between 
the variables of the macro-dynamic model and energy intensity and the one with carbon intensity. 
More  precisely,  R&D  investments  induce  the  developments  of  environment-friendly  technologies 
through  which  GHG  emission  abatement  can  be  undertaken.  At  the  same  time,  these  abatement 
activities increase experience and produce learning, which enhance the effectiveness of environment-
friendly technologies in reducing GHG emissions. The emission reduction takes place through both 
energy-saving and fuel-switching effects. In the model, the different components of technical change 
have a differentiated impact on both effects. 
  The  FEEM-RICE  model  with  the  two  input-two  factor  specification  of  technical  change 
described in previous sections has been used to analyse the optimal dynamic paths of investments, 
R&D  expenditure,  carbon  concentrations  and  temperature  in  three  different  scenarios:  the  BaU 
scenario  and  two  stabilisation  scenarios.  In  the  second  stabilisation  scenario,  permit  trading  was 
allowed for and the optimal demand for permits in various regions of the world has been computed. 
The goal was not normative, i.e. it was not to discuss optimal abatement trajectories, or what climate 
policy should do, but rather positive, i.e. to understand how the model reacts when either different 
targets are imposed, or different policy instruments are used.  
  In addition, an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the main parameters of our 2x2 
formulation  of  technical  change  has  been  carried  out.  This  sensitivity  analysis  has  shown  the   24 
robustness of the model when parameters are changed around the calibrated values and the consistency 
of the results when large changes in the parameters are imposed. 
  The next steps in our research agenda can be described as follows. First, we would like to look 
more closely at the opportunity cost of R&D. Second, it would be useful to extend the model in order 
to include a non-energy sector, thus making it possible to have a better representation of fuel switching 
dynamics. Third, the possibility of a growing effectiveness of carbon sequestration technologies could 
be accounted for in the model. Finally, and most importantly, stochastic components of the process of 
technical change – and therefore uncertainty – must be modelled to develop a more realistic analysis 
of climate policy.   25 
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1. Other Model Equations 
 
In  this  appendix  we  reproduce  the  remaining  equations  that  make  up  the  whole  model.  These 
equations are reported here for the sake of completeness and are the same as the ones found in the 
original RICE 99 model. 
 
In each region, n, there is a social planner who maximizes the following utility function (n indexes the 
world’s regions, t are 10-year time spans): 
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where the pure time preference discount factor is given by: 
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and the pure rate of time preference r(v) is assumed to decline over time. 
 
The maximization problem is subject to: 
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List of variables: 
W = welfare  
U = instantaneous utility 
C = consumption 
L = population 
R = discount factor 
Q = production 
W = damage 
A = productivity or technology index 
KF = capital stock 
CE = carbon energy 
p
E = cost of carbon energy 
I = fixed investment  
E = carbon emissions 
MAT = atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
LU = land-use carbon emissions 
MUP = upper oceans/biosphere CO2 concentrations  
MLO = lower oceans CO2 concentrations  
F = radiative forcing 
T = temperature level 
q￿ = costs of extraction of industrial emissions 
 
List of parameters: 
a, g  = parameters of production function 
dK = rate of depreciation of capital stock 
z = exogenous technical change effect of energy on CO2 emissions (carbon intensity)  
f11, f12, f21, f22, f23, f32, f33 = parameters of the carbon transition matrix 
h = increase in radiative forcing due to doubling of CO2 concentrations from pre-industrial levels 
s1, s2 = temperature dynamics parameters  
l = climate sensitivity parameter 
markup
E￿ = regional energy services markup 
q1, q2 = parameters of the damage function 
PI
AT M = pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
O = increase in radiative forcing over pre-industrial levels due to exogenous anthropogenic causes 
r  = discount rate 
TLO = lower ocean temperature   29 
2.  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Figure A.1. Temperature in degree C above pre-industrial levels in 2105  
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Figure A.5. Temperature in degree C above pre-industrial levels in 2105  
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